K.BABU  (APPELLANT/ACCUSED) Vs. STATE OF KERALA (RESPONDENT)

CRL.A.NO.136 OF 2018
(2JB, A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR & KAUSER EDAPPAGATH JJ., delivered by NAMBIAR J.)

Facts: The accused in S.C.No.425/2009 before the IIIrd Additional Sessions Court, Ernakulam (CBI) is the appellant before us in this Criminal Appeal that impugns the conviction and sentence awarded to him by the trial court which found him guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 302, 383, 449, 397, 392, 201 of the Indian Penal Code [IPC].

Issue:  Whether the appellant is guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 302, 383, 449, 397, 392, 201 of the Indian Penal Code ?

Arguments on behalf of counsel for appellant: Adv. Sri.Renjith B. Marar

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, would refer to the chain of circumstances that is relied upon by the prosecution and argue that the prosecution has not discharged its burden of showing that they point unambiguously to the guilt of the accused as charged. In particular he would submit that while some of the circumstances alleged by the prosecution such as the fact that the appellant was very closely attached to the family of the deceased and was aware of the wealth in the family, that he was in need of money owing to the failure of his bakery business in Tirupur, and that he had left for Tirupur in the early hours of 6.12.2006, the day following the day of the murder, were never in dispute, there were serious infirmities in the evidence adduced to suggest that (i) the appellant was seen in the vicinity of the deceased couple’s house nearer to the time of the alleged incident, (ii) that he had sold two broken golden bangles belonging to the the deceased Anandavally Amma at a Jewellery shop in Tirupur the next day (iii) that the salesman in the Jewellery shop had identified him as the person who sold the broken gold bangles in a TI parade conducted by the Magistrate (iv) that the billhook/koduval recovered pursuant to his confession statement before the CBI officials was the murder weapon (v) that he had sprinkled kerosene and coconut oil on the bed sheets and pillows and lit fire to it after putting it on the dead bodies and (vi) that he had also sprinkled the compound of Pepsi Entrine and Phenol all over the area where he had moved so as to destroy any evidence of his presence at the scene.

Arguments on behalf of counsel for respondent: Adv. Sri.K.P.Satheesan

The learned counsel for the CBI, that prosecuted this case before the trial court, drew support from the findings of the court below to maintain that the prosecution had succeeded in discharging its burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. He points out that the instant was a most heinous crime committed on an elderly couple, and in the absence of any eye witness the prosecution had to rely entirely on circumstantial evidence and they have succeeded in connecting the links in the chain of circumstances despite the limitations faced owing to the belated entrustment of the investigation of the case to them. He also filed an argument note reiterating the points mentioned during the hearing and placing reliance on the following decisions viz. Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor.

Held: The court allowed the present appeal and held that, “we find the prosecution to have failed in proving any acceptable chain of circumstantial evidence which points compellingly and conclusively to the guilt of the appellant who, admittedly does not have any criminal antecedents. We, therefore, allow this appeal by setting aside the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant accused, and acquit him of all the charges brought against him. He will be set at liberty forthwith.”

The court further observed that, “Since we find that the practice of wholesale acceptance of confession statements of accused persons, albeit for introduction of the relevant statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, continues even today, notwithstanding the plethora of judgments of the High Courts and the Supreme Court since the 1960’s that have deprecated the practice, we feel that perhaps the time has now come to hold that the admission into the evidence, of such confessional statements of the accused as are hit by Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, and not saved by the provisions of Section 27 of the Act, would, without anything more, vitiate the trial against the accused and entitle him/her to an acquittal. The breach of a statutory provision that is designed to protect a citizen from self incrimination and arbitrary deprivation of life and personal liberty must necessarily have serious consequences for the prosecution. Constitutional safeguards cannot be rendered a teasing illusion by the very State that is obliged to uphold them.”