Arshnoor Kaur & Anr.(Petitioners) vs, The Union of India & Ors.(Respondents)

WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 772 OF 2023

(Mr. Manmohan and Mr. Dipankar Datta, JJ, delivered by Manmohan, J)

Petitioners, both law graduates, Arshnoor Kaur and Aastha Tyagi, had filed for the 31st Short Service Commission (JAG) Course in October 2023. In the recruitment process, the Army had different vacancies allotted for males and females. For the 31st JAG course, there were six vacancies for males and three for females.

The process of selection was merit-based across each gender category. Under the women’s merit list, the petitioners were ranked 4th and 5th, respectively. Although both had greater merit marks than some of the male candidates who were selected under the men’s category, they were rejected because the women’s quota was only up to three seats.

The petitioners went to the Supreme Court on the strength of Article 32 of the Constitution, claiming a violation of their fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, and 16. The petitioners contended that it falls under gender discrimination in vacancies and that gender-neutral recruitment is required. The petitioners submitted that there was no legislative mandate to impose vacancy restrictions based on gender in the JAG branch. They complained of a lack of reasonableness and that the whole system was capricious.

The Union of India and the Indian Army argued that the allotment of vacancies between men and women was a policy issue. Historically, the Army had maintained a balance between the ratio of men and women in various units to ensure equal representation. The Army highlighted the fact that the recruitment was competitive and in line with available vacancies. Ranking higher than certain candidates in a different category (men’s list) did not confer anyone with an automatic right of admission.

The Court looked at Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950, which provides for women’s eligibility for appointment in the regular Army in such corps, departments, branches, or services as the Central Government may detail. It was observed that no provision under the Act or Rules had fixed gender-based numerical quotas within a particular branch after women were permitted entry.

The Army relied on internal circulars for 2011 and 2012 that mandated distinct vacancy provisions for women and men in the JAG branch. The Court ruled these were administrative instructions and not statutory rules, and therefore could not be used to trump constitutionally guaranteed equality.

The Court stressed merit should be the only basis for selection in competitive recruitment, particularly in non-combat positions like JAG. It pointed out that the petitioners were more meritorious than many male candidates who were inducted but were excluded merely because of their gender category.

The Court reaffirmed the constitutional directive under Articles 14 and 16 that guarantees equality of opportunity in government employment. A policy that keeps fewer jobs reserved for women without a valid and compelling reason is tantamount to indirect discrimination. The Army’s argument that limiting women’s intake was necessary for operational reasons did not convince the Court. It was observed that women officers had already served in the JAG branch performing the same duties as men.

The court held that Petitioner No. 1, Arshnoor Kaur, continued to be eligible and directed the Union of India to induct her into the next available JAG training course. Petitioner No. 2, Aastha Tyagi, who had already joined the Indian Navy during the pendency of the case, was granted no further relief. The Court also said that the Army’s policy of maintaining separate numerical caps for men and women in JAG recruitment was unconstitutional. Recruiting should be carried out through a composite merit list to promote the most meritorious candidates without regard to gender.

The Court’s instructions extended to subsequent recruitment cycles, requiring all departments where women are qualified to carry out selection on a gender-neutral basis unless there is a reason for differentiation that is constitutionally sound.