Tirupathi Rao [Appellant] Vs. Lingamaiah & Ors. [Respondent]
SLP (CIVIL) No.s 19647-48 of 2022
(2JB, Sanjiv Khanna and Dipankar Datta, delivered by Dipankar Datta J.)
In it’s judgement dated 22nd july, 2024, in the case of S.Tirupathi Rao vs. M.Lingamaiah & Ors., the Supreme court of India while hearing appeals assailing the impugned order of the High court which dismissed a contempt appeal of the appellant, held that time barred civil contempt petitions cannot be entertained simply by accepting the argument of a continuing wrong.
The division Bench of Justice Sanjiv Khanna and Justice Dipankar Datta held that, “Stale claims of contempt, camouflaged as a continuing wrong/breach/offence ought not to be entertained, having regard to the legislative intent for introducing section 20 in the Act which has been noticed above. Contempt being a personal action directed against a particular person alleged to be in contempt, much of the efficacy of the proceedings would be lost by passage of time. Even if a contempt is committed and within the stipulated period of one year from such commission no action is brought before the court on the specious ground that the contempt has been continuing, no party should be encouraged to wait indefinitely to choose his own time to approach the court. If the bogey of “continuing wrong/breach/offence” is mechanically accepted whenever it is advanced as a ground for claiming exemption, an applicant may knock the doors of the Court any time suiting his convenience. If an action for contempt is brought belatedly, say any time after the initial period of limitation and years after the date of first breach, it is the prestige of the court that would seem to become a casualty during the period the breach continues.”
The court further held that, “even if a point of comtinuing breach/offence is traceable in pleadings, it ought not to be accepted mechanically.” The Supreme Court indicated that if a contempt action is initiated late, such as any time after the initial limitation period and years after the first breach, it is the court’s prestige that would suffer during the time the breach persists, holding thus, that, “Not only would the delay militate against the legislative intent of inserting section 20 in the Act (a provision not found in the predecessor statutes of the Act) rendering the section a dead letter, the damage caused to the majesty of the court could be rendered irreparable. It is, therefore, the essence of justice that in a case of proved civil contempt, the contemnor is suitably dealt with, including imposition of punishment, and direction as well is issued to bridge the breach.”
The court thus concluded that High court has exceeded its contempt and review jurisdiction, holding that, “the orders passed by the High Court upholding the legality of the contempt petition are not tenable in the eyes of the law“, and thus restored the letters patent appeal, therefore allowing the present appeal, leaving the determination of issues like title and validity of decrees in favour of respondents open for decision by a competent forum.
