DELHI STATE LEGAL SERVICES AUTHORITY [ Appellant] Vs. ANNWESHA DEB [ Respondent]
LPA 701/2023, CM APPLs. 52932/2023, 52933/2023, 63165/2023 & 64284/2023
(2JB, V. KAMESWAR RAO and SAURABH BANERJEE JJ., delivered by V. KAMESWAR RAO, J.)
Facts: This appeal has been preferred by the Delhi State Legal Services Authority (hereafter referred to as, Authority) / appellant against the impugned judgment dated July 26, 2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C.) 11016/2017, with the following prayers: ―
“It is therefore, prayed that in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to: 1. Pass an order/direction for quashing/setting aside the judgment dated 26th July 2023 passed by the Learned Single Judge in W.P.(C.) 11016/2017;
- Pass any such order(s) as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case.”
Issue: Whether the claim of maternity benefits under the Act of 1961, being a statutory right, is available to the respondent, which has been granted in her favor by the learned Single Judge?
Arguments on behalf of counsel for appellant:
Dr. Amit George, the learned Counsel for the Authority stated that the Act of 1987, was enacted to provide free and competent legal services to the weaker sections of the Society and to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizens by reason of economic or other disability. He also stated that the conclusion in the impugned judgment would make similarly placed empanelled Advocates/Standing Counsel of various organisations, Authorities, Government, to claim maternity benefits under the Act of 1961. He also stated that the Authority itself has around 1200 empanelled Advocates and does not have the wherewithal to pay maternity benefits to every empanelled woman Advocate, as it has limited resources with the intent to provide free legal aid to vulnerable and marginalised communities in the society.
Arguments on behalf of counsel for respondent:
On the other hand, Dr. Charu Wali Khanna, learned counsel appearing for the respondent would submit that the provisions of the Act of 1961 / Maternity Benefit (Amendment) Act, 2017 need to be distinguished from other Acts of law as the Act clearly states that, ―An Act to regulate the employment of women in certain establishments for certain periods before and after childbirth and to provide for maternity benefit and certain other benefits‖. She stated that, it is not necessary for a woman to be an employee, but it is sufficient to attract the provisions of the Act which includes right to maternity benefits, if a person is a woman and employed for wages. She also stated that the Act vide Section 5(1) creates the right of a woman to claim the benefits.
Held: The court allowed the present appeal and held that, “the interpretation of the words Employment and Wages in the Act of 1961, by the learned Single Judge, if allowed to stand, would mean that, an entity engaging professionals like an Advocate, shall be bound to give the maternity benefits to each of those who are engaged professionally. This interpretation by the Learned Single Judge is completely misplaced in law and would have serious repercussion. We are not in agreement with the parity sought to be drawn by the Learned Single Judge between Authority and the respondent, for the reason that there cannot be a comparison between an Advocate who continues to act as such and an employee who is appointed as per the Recruitment Rules of the Authority. In view of our aforesaid discussion, we hold that the learned Single Judge has erred in extending the benefits of the Act of 1961 to the respondent, more particularly, given the nature of her appointment. The appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. It is ordered accordingly. No costs.”
