{"id":3847,"date":"2026-08-19T09:49:41","date_gmt":"2026-08-19T04:19:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/?p=3847"},"modified":"2026-08-19T09:49:41","modified_gmt":"2026-08-19T04:19:41","slug":"delhi-high-court-refuses-suit-for-specific-performance-after-two-decades-of-inaction","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/delhi-high-court-refuses-suit-for-specific-performance-after-two-decades-of-inaction\/","title":{"rendered":"Delhi High Court Refuses Suit for Specific Performance After Two Decades of Inaction"},"content":{"rendered":"

Rattan Singh\u00a0 [Appellant\u00a0 ]\u00a0 <\/b>Vs.\u00a0 \u00a0<\/b>Akhtar Islam [Respondent]<\/b><\/h1>\n

RSA 271\/2017, CM APPL. 53087\/2023 and<\/b><\/h1>\n

CM APPL 68162\/2025<\/b><\/h1>\n

(SJB, Neena Bansal Krishna, J.)<\/b><\/h1>\n

 <\/p>\n

Overview<\/b><\/p>\n

In this case, the Delhi High Court examined whether a purchaser who was inactive for more than 20 years could still ask for specific performance of an agreement to sell. The appeal challenged the judgments of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, which directed the defendant to execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff.<\/span><\/p>\n

The principal issue to be dealt with by the Court was whether the plaintiff had acted within the prescribed limitation period and continuously remained ready and willing to perform his obligations under the agreement.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Facts of the Case<\/b><\/p>\n

The dispute concerned a plot measuring 680 square yards at Jogabai, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi. An agreement for its sale was executed by the parties in July 1966 for \u20b98160 out of which \u20b91700 was paid as earnest money. Since litigation which involved the property was already pending, in June 1967, a supplementary agreement was executed. Under the arrangement, the plaintiff paid an additional \u20b93200, making the total amount paid, \u20b94900.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The supplementary agreement stated that the sale deed would be executed within three months after the conclusion of the pending litigation. It further provided that if the plot could not be transferred legally, the defendant would instead sell his residential house to the plaintiff for the amount which was already received.<\/span><\/p>\n

The litigation pertaining to the plot concluded in September 1976. However, the plaintiff neither contacted the defendant nor issued any notice for several years. A suit for specific performance was filed in September 1988, after alleging that the defendant intended to dispose of the property.<\/span><\/p>\n

The suit was decreed by the Trial Court, and the First Appellate Court affirmed the decision. Aggrieved by the same, the defendant preferred the present second appeal.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Legal Issues<\/b><\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Whether the suit for specific performance was barred by limitation.<\/span><\/li>\n
  2. Whether the plaintiff proved continuous readiness and willingness to perform his obligations under the agreement.<\/span><\/li>\n
  3. Whether the plaintiff\u2019s prolonged inaction amounted to abandonment of his contractual rights.<\/span><\/li>\n
  4. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to equitable relief of specific performance after such an extraordinary delay.<\/span><\/li>\n
  5. Whether the judgments of the courts below suffer from legal infirmity in granting specific performance despite the facts on record.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

     <\/p>\n

    Decision<\/b><\/p>\n

    The Delhi High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgements of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court and dismissed the suit.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    The Court held that the suit was clearly barred by limitation. Since the earlier litigation concluded in September 1976, the cause of action arose three months later. However, the plaintiff filed the suit in September 1988, beyond the statutory period prescribed by law.<\/span><\/p>\n

    The Court further held that the plaintiff failed to establish the continuous readiness and willingness required under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act 1963. No material was produced to demonstrate his financial capacity to complete the transaction and he remained inactive for over 20 years without making any effort to enforce the agreement.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    It was also observed by the Court that specific performance is a discretionary remedy. Granting such relief after decades of unexplained delay, particularly when circumstances and property values had changed, would be inequitable. The appeal was allowed accordingly, and the suit for specific performance by the plaintiff was dismissed.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Rattan Singh\u00a0 [Appellant\u00a0 ]\u00a0 Vs.\u00a0 \u00a0Akhtar Islam [Respondent] RSA 271\/2017, CM APPL. 53087\/2023 and CM APPL 68162\/2025 (SJB, Neena Bansal Krishna, J.)   Overview In this case, the Delhi High Court examined whether a purchaser who was inactive for more than 20 years could still ask for specific performance of an agreement to sell. The […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":3849,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[12],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3847","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-judgement"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3847","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3847"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3847\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3850,"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3847\/revisions\/3850"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3849"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3847"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3847"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3847"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}