{"id":1446,"date":"2024-02-08T13:10:12","date_gmt":"2024-02-08T07:40:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/?p=1446"},"modified":"2024-02-08T13:10:12","modified_gmt":"2024-02-08T07:40:12","slug":"supreme-court-holds-that-the-accused-could-not-have-claimed-the-statutory-right-of-default-bail-under-section-1672-on-the-ground-that-the-investigation-qua-other-accused-was-pending","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/supreme-court-holds-that-the-accused-could-not-have-claimed-the-statutory-right-of-default-bail-under-section-1672-on-the-ground-that-the-investigation-qua-other-accused-was-pending\/","title":{"rendered":"Supreme court holds that the accused could not have claimed the statutory right of default bail under Section 167(2) on the ground that the investigation qua other accused was pending"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1><strong>CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION\u00a0 \u00a0 [<\/strong>APPELLANT(S)]\u00a0 <strong>Vs.\u00a0 \u00a0<\/strong><strong>KAPIL WADHAWAN &amp; ANR.\u00a0 \u00a0[<\/strong>RESPONDENT(S)]<\/h1>\n<p>CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 391 OF 2024<\/p>\n<p>(2JB, BELA M. TRIVEDI and PANKAJ MITHAL JJ., delivered by <strong>BELA M. TRIVEDI J<\/strong>.)<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong><u>Facts:<\/u><\/strong> The appellant-CBI has sought to challenge the impugned order dated 30.05.2023 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in CRL. M.C. No. 6544 of 2022 upholding the order dated 03.12.2022 passed by the Special Judge (PC Act), CBI-08, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the Special Court), by which respondent nos. 1 and 2 have been granted default bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.<\/p>\n<p><strong><u>Issue:<\/u><\/strong> Whether the respondents were entitled to the benefit of the statutory right conferred under the proviso to sub section 2 of Section 167 Cr.P.C, on the ground that the investigation qua some of the accused named in the FIR was pending, though the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 (Chargesheet) against respondents along with the other accused was filed within the prescribed time limit and though the cognizance of the offence was taken by the special court before the consideration of the application of the respondents seeking default bail under Section 167 (2) Cr.P.C.?<\/p>\n<p><strong><u>Arguments on behalf of counsel for appellants:<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The learned ASG, Mr. S.V. Raju for the appellant vehemently submitted that the chargesheet was filed by the appellant-CBI on the completion of the investigation qua 75 accused including the present respondents stating that further investigation qua some other accused was pending, which did not mean that an incomplete chargesheet was filed against the respondents. Learned ASG submitted that report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. filed by the CBI was complete containing all the details as required by law. In the instant case, the statutory bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. has been granted by the courts below after the Special Court took the cognizance of the alleged offences against the respondents, which is against the statutory scheme of the Code. According to him, it is only when a chargesheet is not filed and investigation is kept pending, the benefit of the proviso appended to sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code would be available to the offender, however once the chargesheet is filed, the said right of the accused ceases, and such a right does not revive merely because a further investigation remains pending within the meaning of Section 173(8) of the Code. To buttress his submissions, Mr. S.V. Raju has placed heavy reliance on the decision in case of Dinesh Dalmia vs. CBI1 . He also relied upon the judgment in M. Ravindran v. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence2 , to submit that where the accused fails to apply for default bail when his right accrues, and subsequently a chargesheet, additional complaint or a report seeking extension of time is preferred before the Magistrate, the right to default bail would be extinguished.<\/p>\n<p><strong><u>Arguments on behalf of counsel for respondents:<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Per contra, the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Mukul Rohatgi for the respondent no. 1 submitted that the issue of cognizance had nothing to do with the default bail, in as much as the right under Section 167(2) is a statutory right, when the chargesheet is not filed within the prescribed time limit and even if filed, a complete chargesheet is not filed. According to him, the courts below have concluded that it was an incomplete chargesheet that was filed by the CBI, which entitled the respondents to the statutory right of getting the benefit of default bail under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi has relied upon the decision in Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain Vs. State of Maharashtra &amp; Anr.3 to buttress his submission that cognizance is not relevant basis for determining whether the investigation is complete or not for the purpose of default bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. Reliance is also placed on the decision in case of Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam4 , to submit that if the chargesheet is not filed and the right for default bail has ripened into the status of indefeasibility, it cannot be frustrated by the prosecution on any pretext. Mr. Rohatgi sought to distinguish the Dalmia\u2019s case (supra) relied upon by Ld. ASG Mr. S.V. Raju by submitting that in the said case, the accused was absconding and the chargesheet was already filed, whereas in the instant case, the chargesheet filed has been held to be incomplete. According to him, the concurrent findings recorded by two courts, unless perverse should not be interfered with, even if there was an error of law. He further submitted that once the bail is granted and interim order staying the operation of such order passed by the High Court is not passed by the Supreme Court, the proceeding partakes the colour of cancellation of bail for which the criteria are absolutely different.<\/p>\n<p><strong><u>Held:<\/u><\/strong> The court allowed the present appeal and held that, \u201c<em>we have no hesitation in holding that the chargesheet having been filed against the respondents-accused within the prescribed time limit and the cognizance having been taken by the Special Court of the 22 offences allegedly committed by them, the respondents could not have claimed the statutory right of default bail under Section 167(2) on the ground that the investigation qua other accused was pending. Both, the Special Court as well as the High Court having committed serious error of law in disregarding the legal position enunciated and settled by this Court, the impugned orders deserve to be set aside and are accordingly set aside.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION\u00a0 \u00a0 [APPELLANT(S)]\u00a0 Vs.\u00a0 \u00a0KAPIL WADHAWAN &amp; ANR.\u00a0 \u00a0[RESPONDENT(S)] CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 391 OF 2024 (2JB, BELA M. TRIVEDI and PANKAJ MITHAL JJ., delivered by BELA M. TRIVEDI J.) &nbsp; Facts: The appellant-CBI has sought to challenge the impugned order dated 30.05.2023 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":1448,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[12],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1446","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-judgement"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1446","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1446"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1446\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1450,"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1446\/revisions\/1450"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1448"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1446"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1446"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1446"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}