{"id":1166,"date":"2023-11-29T09:34:51","date_gmt":"2023-11-29T04:04:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/?p=1166"},"modified":"2023-11-29T09:34:51","modified_gmt":"2023-11-29T04:04:51","slug":"supreme-court-held-that-high-court-or-the-court-of-session-could-grant-limited-anticipatory-bail-in-the-form-of-an-interim-protection-under-section-438-of-crpc-in-the-interest-of-justice-with-respect","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/supreme-court-held-that-high-court-or-the-court-of-session-could-grant-limited-anticipatory-bail-in-the-form-of-an-interim-protection-under-section-438-of-crpc-in-the-interest-of-justice-with-respect\/","title":{"rendered":"Supreme court held that High Court or the Court of Session could grant limited anticipatory bail in the form of an interim protection under Section 438 of CrPC in the interest of justice with respect to an FIR registered outside the territorial jurisdiction subject to conditions"},"content":{"rendered":"

PRIYA INDORIA\u00a0<\/strong> \u00a0[APPELLANT ]\u00a0 Vs.\u00a0 STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. ETC. <\/strong>[RESPONDENTS]<\/p>\n

CRIMINAL APPEAL Arising out of SLP(Crl.) Nos.11423-11426 of 2023<\/p>\n

(2JB, B.V. NAGARATHNA and UJJAL BHUYAN JJ., delivered by NAGARATHNA, J<\/strong>.)<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Facts:<\/u><\/strong> The present appeals have been filed by the complainant-wife, against the orders dated 07.07.2022 passed by the learned Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge Bengaluru City in Criminal Misc. No. 3941\/2022, 3943\/2022, 3944\/2022 and 3945\/2022. By the said orders, the learned Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge Bengaluru City has granted anticipatory bail to the accused-husband and his family namely, accused Nos. 2,3 & 4 in FIR No. 43\/2022 which alleged commission of offences under Sections 498A, 406 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, registered by the complainant-wife at Chirawa Police Station, District Jhunjhunu, Rajasthan.<\/p>\n

Issues:<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

1.Whether the power of the High Court or the Court of Session to grant anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the CrPC could be exercised with respect to an FIR registered outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said Court?<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Whether the practice of granting transit anticipatory bail or interim protection to enable an applicant seeking anticipatory bail to make an application under Section 438 of the CrPC before a Court of competent jurisdiction is consistent with the administration of criminal justice?<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Arguments on behalf of counsel for appellant:<\/u><\/strong> Sri Vikramjeet Banerjee<\/p>\n

    Section 438 of CrPC has only used the term \u2018High Court or the Court of Session\u2019, as the case may be\u2019 but has not specified whether such a \u2018High Court or the Court of Session\u2019 has to be the same Court which can take cognizance of the matter or can be any \u2018High Court or Court of Session\u2019 across the country. Therefore, there exists limited legislative guidance about the power of a Court to grant anticipatory bail for an offence that is registered outside its territorial jurisdiction, in other words, whether \u2018extra-territorial anticipatory bail\u2019 can be granted by a High Court or Court of Session to a person apprehending arrest. Learned amicus clarified that anticipatory bail and \u2018transit anticipatory bail\u2019 are different, as the former may or may not be restricted to a time period, whereas the latter is always granted for a specific time period, until an applicant can make an application for anticipatory bail before a Court that can take \u2018cognizance\u2019 of the offence. Referring to the judgement of this Court in Navinchandra Majithia vs. State of Maharashtra<\/em><\/strong>, (2000) 7 SCC 640, learned amicus apprised this Court of an alternative approach that is based on the \u2018cause of action\u2019 theory in criminal law. In view of the facts of the present case, it was submitted that the cause of action essentially arose in the matrimonial home of the parties in Bengaluru, Karnataka and continued in the complainant-wife\u2019s paternal home in Chirawa, Rajasthan. Therefore, Courts at either of these places may exercise their jurisdiction.<\/p>\n

    Arguments on behalf of counsel for respondent:<\/u><\/strong> Sri V.N. Raghupathy<\/p>\n

    Learned counsel for the State of Karnataka submitted that having regard to the relevant judicial precedents on Section 438 of CrPC, an appropriate order may be made in this case.<\/p>\n

    Held:<\/u><\/strong> The court with respect to the first issue held that, \u201cconsidering the constitutional imperative of protecting a citizen\u2019s right to life, personal liberty and dignity, the High Court or the Court of Session could grant limited anticipatory bail in the form of an interim protection under Section 438 of CrPC in the interest of justice with respect to an FIR registered outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said Court, and subject to the following conditions:<\/p>\n

      \n
    • Prior to passing an order of limited anticipatory bail, the investigating officer and public prosecutor who are seized of the FIR shall be issued notice on the first date of the hearing, though the Court in an appropriate case would have the discretion to grant interim anticipatory bail.<\/li>\n
    • The order of grant of limited anticipatory bail must record reasons as to why the applicant apprehends an inter-state arrest and the impact of such grant of limited anticipatory bail or interim protection, as the case may be, on the status of the investigation.<\/li>\n
    • The jurisdiction in which the cognizance of the offence has been taken does not exclude the said offence from the scope of anticipatory bail by way of a State Amendment to Section 438 of CrPC.<\/li>\n
    • The applicant for anticipatory bail must satisfy the Court regarding his inability to seek anticipatory bail from the Court which has the territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

      With respect to the second issue, it was held that, \u201cIf a rejection of the plea for limited\/transitory anticipatory bail is made solely with reference to the concept of territorial jurisdiction it would be adding a restriction to the exercise of powers under Section 438. This, in our view, would result in miscarriage and travesty of justice, aggravating the adversity of the accused who is apprehending arrest. It would also be against the principles of access to justice. We say so for the reason that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt and in accordance with law. In the circumstances, we hold that the Court of Session or the High Court, as the case may be, can exercise jurisdiction and entertain a plea for limited anticipatory bail even if the FIR has not been filed within its territorial jurisdiction and depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, if the accused apprehending arrest makes out a case for grant of anticipatory bail but having regard to the fact that the FIR has not been registered within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court or Court of Session, as the case may, at the least consider the case of the accused for grant of transit anticipatory bail which is an interim protection of limited duration till such accused approaches the competent Sessions Court or the High Court, as the case may be, for seeking full-fledged anticipatory bail.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

      PRIYA INDORIA\u00a0 \u00a0[APPELLANT ]\u00a0 Vs.\u00a0 STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. ETC. [RESPONDENTS] CRIMINAL APPEAL Arising out of SLP(Crl.) Nos.11423-11426 of 2023 (2JB, B.V. NAGARATHNA and UJJAL BHUYAN JJ., delivered by NAGARATHNA, J.)   Facts: The present appeals have been filed by the complainant-wife, against the orders dated 07.07.2022 passed by the learned Additional City Civil […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":1168,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[12],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1166","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-judgement"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1166","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1166"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1166\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1169,"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1166\/revisions\/1169"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1168"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1166"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1166"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/xpertslegal.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1166"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}