MAGHAVENDRA PRATAP SINGH @ PANKAJ SINGH (APPELLANT) Vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH (RESPONDENT)
(CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 915 OF 2016)
(2JB, B.R. GAVAI and SANJAY KAROL JJ., delivered by SANJAY KAROL J.)
Facts: The present appeal has been preferred against the Judgment passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal of 2013, by which he stands convicted for having committed an offence punishable under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860 with life imprisonment and fine; under Section 201 of the IPC, punishable with 7 years Rigorous imprisonment and fine; under Section 25(1)(1b)(a) of the Arms Act, 1959, 3 years Rigorous imprisonment and fine.
Issue: 1. Whether the Investigating Officer in the present case had complied with the duties and responsibilities cast upon him by virtue of Chapter XII of Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973?
- Whether the court below, while acquitting all the other co accused in connection with the same crime, erred in not returning a finding qua the instant appellant – a co accused in respect of a charged framed under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860?
- Whether the impugned judgments convicting the appellant are sustainable in law or not?
Held: The court, while allowing the present appeal, set aside the judgment of the high court, while observing, as regards the first question, while relying on Common cause v. Union of India amongst others, it was observed by the court that, “that the Investigating Officer did not meet the obligations he was under, and numerous infirmities affected the conduct of the Investigation Officer calling into question, credibly, the investigation conducted by him or upon his directions.”
As regards the second question, while relying on Geeta Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., the court observed that, “the High Court, by virtue of being the First Appellate Court ought to reappreciated and discussed the evidence on record. Had that been done completely in the present case, the High Court would have returned a finding on Section 120B of IPC.”
As regards the third question, the court observed, that, “the principle of determining the guilt of the accused in a case involving circumstantial evidence is not that of probability but certainty and that all the evidence present should conclusively point towards only a singular hypothesis, which is the guilt of the accused.”, which was not done in the present case.
